Estética husserliana: imaginação, fantasia, imagem e percepção

Abstract

This work approaches the phenomenological aesthetics from concepts developed by Edmund Husserl, such as imagination, fantasy, eidetic intuition, fiction and perception. The phenomenological aesthetics is largely associated with the French phenomenological tradition, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne as great representatives. However, we start from the conceptual nucleus already found in the original constitution of phenomenology to think about the theoretical paths that resulted in the foundation of a properly phenomenological aesthetic. The Husserlian critique of positivism and psychologism, in the formulation of his theory of knowledge linked to logic, founds a method of analysis directed to the intentional objects constituting all conscious experience and which, therefore, correspond to related objects linked to the structure that constitutes the transcendental consciousness, namely, intentionality, with which the dualistic view of division between consciousness and world is abolished, this condition being one of the modes of being of the aesthetic experience itself. As well as the proposal of a transcendental subjectivity that, contrary to what these concepts may suggest, does not fit into a radical idealism and, therefore, phenomenology, from its Husserlian bases, can contribute with Aesthetics with regard to reflections on the artistic or aesthetic objects themselves. Equally important are the concepts of eidetic intuition, imaginative consciousness, as well as the centrality of notions of fantasy and fiction to the Husserlian project of a phenomenological analysis of the transcendent and the surrounding world. Based on this theoretical context, aesthetic experience corresponds to the phenomenological experience from the common notions already mentioned and closely related, such as imagination, fantasy and even fiction, an element that occupies a privileged space in the analysis of transcendent phenomena and which legitimizes, like the imagination, the aesthetic and phenomenological experiences as experiences of self-reflection based on lasting elements effected by imagination and intuition. The public conscience that constitutes this analysis is directly committed to the establishment of a model of metaphysical investigation that finds in its own intuitive and imaginative capacities of the consciousness its conducting components until the foundation of the eidetic knowledge, or still, of the necessary conditions so that the modality of intentional relation that characterizes the properly aesthetic experience of the work of art allows the descriptive analysis of this same relation, which will result in the unveiling of the being of the aesthetic object. Therefore, it is in the context of intentionality, that is, of the correlation between consciousness and aesthetic object, that happens the phenomenological imaginative experience, which, here, is taken as being similar to the aesthetic experience.