O fundamento para a liberdade de expressão em Dworkin

Abstract

This thesis aims to present the foundations of freedom of expression in contemporary democracies based on the thinking of Ronald Dworkin. We intend to demonstrate how the author substantiates the existence and extent of free human expression. We will see that Dworkin considers most of the foundations used in current discussions related to freedom of expression to be unsatisfactory, especially because the most relevant discussions adopt utilitarian arguments. Briefly, utilitarian arguments explain the need for freedom of expression based on the theoretically beneficial results that result from this freedom, the most relevant being three, namely: favoring the search for truth through free expression; expression as an instrument of democratic participation and put an end to free expression as an instrument that favors well-informed political decision-making, with our hypothesis being that the author overcomes such arguments. Regarding the hypothesis, it is important to present the concepts of freedom and equality as brought by Dworkin. Presenting now the concept of freedom, we will see that the author uses Isaiah Berlin regarding the proposal to divide positive freedom and negative freedom. The first is defined as a space in which the individual can act without restrictions. The second is the individual's space in which the State cannot interfere without such interference resulting in an attack on the individual's ethical independence. In relation to equality in Dworkin, he considers it a basic concept of current political science because for Dworkin the very foundation of contemporary liberal democratic political systems is the obligation of the state to act in a neutral (egalitarian) way in relation to any judgment regarding ethical choices. of individuals. For this purpose, we will present a systematic reading of what the author defends as the foundations for freedom of expression, and then point out the points of approximation and divergence that emerged from these foundations with those presented by his critics (Jeremy Waldron, Catherine Mackinnon and Abigail Levin) not losing sight of the current environment for realizing freedom of expression, especially new media. Contrary to Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron will understand that both the dignity of those who suffer from hate speech and the harm to the social inclusion of these same people is sufficient reason to restrict hate speech. In the same sense, Abigail Levin will understand that there must be control over hate speech so that an unequal space in public debate is not created as a result, therefore prohibition and limitation would be, for Levin, necessary and useful instruments for balance in public spaces of discussion. In turn, Catherine Mackinnon will understand censorship as desirable when faced with manifestations of hatred or sexism because such manifestations themselves are instruments of imbalance in democratic relations. Our thesis is the result of a critical comparison of the foundations presented by Dworkin in opposition to the thinking of his critics in the scenario of new challenges to founding freedom of expression.