Leitura moral da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito? Um diálogo entre Ronald Dworkin e Lenio Streck

Abstract

The confrontation with the approach of legal theory based on an assumption of methodological neutrality is no longer the premise that leads to the best way to understand contemporary philosophy of law. Any theory in this regard must, therefore, concern itself with defining the concept of law to which it relates. In light of this requirement, Ronald Dworkin's argument in favor of his interpretivist theory is developed based on a holism (the unity of value thesis) regarding our legal, political, and moral conceptions, in the sense that these mutually strengthen one another and point toward the most integral and coherent, and therefore most adequate, interpretation of the concept of the rule of law. The purpose of this work is to present, through the phenomenological-hermeneutic method, the dialogue between the Critical Hermeneutics of Law theory, by Lenio Streck, and Dworkin’s interpretivism which, despite sharing some assumptions, due to the epistemological premises adopted by the authors, will ultimately involve differences that will be, to some extent, irreconcilable, at the risk of distorting both proposals.