Normatividade e valor no naturalismo moral

Abstract

This work addresses contemporary moral naturalism from the investigation of an array of formulations of the argument known as the naturallistic fallacy, as from the contrast of a few non-naturalistic theories, especially G. E. Moore’s. Proceeding from the analysis of such formulations of the argument in the formal context of contemporary metaethics, attempting to assert the validity of the naturallistic fallacy in the current context, as so its limits in its application against moral naturalism. Then I am going to present moral naturalism in a humean version, which suggests a descriptivist naturalism instead of a prescriptivist one. Such origins of naturalism will be worked with and some positions in metaethics to further understand of the contemporary situation of the moral debate concerning the naturalization of ethics will be presented, contrasting theories of action and of value on the matter of moral motivation and normativity.