Aristóteles e o ativismo judicial

Abstract

This thesis addresses the topic of judicial activism using the political philosophy of Aristotle as its theoretical foundation. It consists of a theoretical study based on bibliographic consultation. The works of the aforementioned Greek philosopher, especially "Nicomachean Ethics" and "Politics," serve as a framework of principles and concepts for understanding the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon of judicial activism and for organizing knowledge, formulating hypotheses, and offering conclusions. The thesis explored in this work is that judicial activism, which is embodied in the practice of judges, particularly in supreme courts, making decisions that interpret the Constitution in a way that expands their own power while simultaneously limiting or replacing the role of other institutions responsible for constitutional interpretation and application, is detrimental to democracy. This is because it depreciates the exercise of a calculative or deliberative faculty, in the sense that a fair outcome depends on the concrete circumstances in which each individual receives what is rightfully theirs. In conclusion, the thesis presents the challenge to the citizen of modern democracy to take responsibility for their own maturation and improvement, to recognize themselves as part of a tradition that gives them social identity, and to transcend their horizon of interests to overcome the illusory separation between the individual and society. However, as long as judicial activism encroaches on the competence of representative bodies, democracy will suffer from the devaluation of popular deliberations.