A teoria dos contratos incompletos e a análise econômica do direito

Abstract

In this study, will be sought to investigate the theory of incomplete contracts the light of the postulates of Economic Analysis of Law, analyzing the reasons that serve to consolidate this form of contract as a mechanism for overcoming the existing information asymmetry between the parties and existing transaction costs in the market. In this context, initially will examine the issue of information asymmetry existing contracts, passing by the analysis also the occurrence of opportunistic behavior and imperative and subsidiary rules to level the informational imbalance, as it includes, in particular, good faith contract under corporate contracts. In follow-up will be analyzed transaction costs, which would be in match against its existence, suggesting incomplete contracts as a tool to obtain efficient exchanges and great between the parties. The alleged deliberate lacunosidade of incomplete contracts would not be obstacle to business efficiency as would, likewise, subsidiary rules and contractual arrangements, in the case relational contracts, which viabilizariam the optimal exchange of goods and services between the parties.