Do naturalismo ao construtivismo: em direção a uma teoria híbrida em metaética

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to defend an objective conception of morality by combining two distinct approaches in metaethics: naturalism and constructivism. This investigation seeks to propose an intermediate alternative between antirealism and metaphysical moral realism, insofar as both positions appear unsatisfactory. The thesis thus examines the possibility of reconciling naturalism and moral constructivism by articulating these two approaches within a hybrid conception of morality – constructivist naturalism – which preserves both the natural and empirical dimension of the moral phenomenon and its normative character. The problem arises from a potential objection to this strategy: naturalism and constructivism may be seen as incompatible approaches. This objection stems from the fact that naturalism and constructivism are often regarded as antagonistic views, commonly associated with moral realism and moral antirealism, respectively. The hypothesis defended here is that naturalism and constructivism are in fact compatible and can be complementary. The argumentative strategy developed in this dissertation maintains that it is possible to formulate a version of moral constructivism that is compatible both with a basic form of moral realism and with a non-reductive model of naturalism. This model is aligned with naturalistic theories that seek to describe the moral phenomenon on empirical grounds – without aiming to provide a normative justification – drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology, according to which the genesis of morality is closely associated with moral emotions. The constructivist counterpart aims to combine philosophical ethical constructivism with relevant contributions from social constructivism, integrating rational and social elements into a broad conception of the constructive process. From this perspective, morality, as we currently conceive it, is understood as being socially constructed upon a natural basis and subsequently rationally systematized. In this way, the dissertation seeks to defend the viability of a hybrid theory that articulates naturalism and constructivism through a dual aspect of morality: on the one hand, there are natural facts about human moral psychology – such as intuitions and emotions that constitute moral sensibility and provide the basis for moral judgments; on the other hand, the normative dimension – that is, moral norms – has its origin in moral agency. Therefore, the proposal of this dissertation does not aim to dissolve the fact/value dichotomy, but rather to offer theoretical conditions for articulating these two domains in a coherent manner, without neglecting scientific findings in the field of ethics.