Análise do controle acionário familiar nas características da remuneração por desempenho

Abstract

The Agency Theory understands that some problems arise from the relationship between principal and agent originated, among others, by self-interest or by different objectives between the parties. One of the tools that can be used to minimize this difficulty is the performance compensation, because when it is linked to the managers´remuneration, they tend to seek a better result for the organization. The existence of a family inserted in the organizations has been shown able to influence in the values and ways to accomplish the remuneration by performance, interfering in its characteristics. In view of this context, this study had as general objective to analyze the influence of the family insertion on the characteristics of the performance compensation system used as management control. With this purpose, a descriptive and quantitative research was delineated, using the hypothetical-deductive method. The survey population was formed of all companies listed on the BM & FBovespa in the year 2017 and the data were collected through the application of a questionnaire (survey) and also the use of documentary research. The data analysis was made using descriptive statistics and statistical inference. The techniques used in data analysis were the factorial analysis, which originated five latent factors and cluster analysis resulting in three different clusters. Subsequently hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 were tested by using the Spearman correlation, however, it was not possible to prove it by the lack of statistical significance. In addition, the sample was separated into two groups, familiar and unfamiliar, and it was possible to identify statistically significant differences between the groups for the factors "long-term commitment" and "intrinsic motivation". The results suggest that family control interferes with some performancecompensation features.