Remuneração dos executivos : o impacto da abertura de capital de empresas na B3

Abstract

The opening of capital of companies are carried out through a process called initial public offering (IPO), with the main objective of obtaining money for these companies by selling their shares on a stock exchange. This dissertation aims to verify whether there is an average increase in executives remuneration in the two years prior to the IPO in comparison to the two years following the IPO, which may mean the existence of particular reasons for executives to make this decision, as per defended by the agency theory. A sample of 63 companies that went public on B3 between 2010 and 2020 was selected. The way used to achieve this objective was to analyze the reference forms issued by these companies, using the Mann-Whitney and anova tests, which helped to find significant differences in means. The results obtained indicate a 183.66% increase in executive remuneration in the two years following the IPO over the amounts received in the two years prior to this operation. Increases between these periods also occur taking into account the inflation of the period, different sectors of activity, number of executives, year of opening and shareholding concentration in the largest and three largest share owners. This variation is higher than that observed in the companies revenues and expenses in the period, however it is lower than that observed in the net profit and total assets accounts.