Níveis de penalidades éticas aplicadas aos contabilistas sob a luz da análise do poder

Abstract

The objective of this study was to verify if politically connected accounting professionals, sued for ethical infractions, have a higher probability of receiving a less severe punishment. For such, were analyzed 390 open cases against professional accountants with active registrations in the Regional Accounting Council of the State of Mato Grosso, res judicata in the period from 2014 to 2018. The study had a probabilistic approach, and thus, logistic regression was used for the econometric exam. The analyzes originated from the foucaultian theory that, in power relations, both the dominator and the dominated utilize strategies to impose or free themselves of punishment. The results show that the admonition and censure penalties are applied the most often. The evidence shows that being affiliated to a political party can be a significant factor to explain the levels of ethical penalties imposed to accountants. The results of the regression show a lower probability that accountants which are connected by a political affiliation will be punished with less severity. Other factors, such as recidivism, contumacy, age and professional experience, have shown to be relevant to explain the response variable. Irregularities in the elaboration of Personal Financial Statements (Decore), was the most committed infraction by accountants in the analyzed period. The results suggest that punishments to the accountants are imposed with tendencies to protect the professional and the profession from the critical examination of society. This study can contribute to the literature, by allowing the discussion of the behavior of the accountant in relation to professional ethics, with its analysis technique being power in the perspective of Michel Foucault.