Responsabilidade moral política em Hannah Arendt

Abstract

The thesis deals with moral and political responsibility in Hannah Arendt. It follows the Philosophy itinerary on responsibility. The debate between Joel Feinberg and Hannah Arendt on the concept of collective responsibility is initially reconstituted, with the specific objective of presenting the problem that will be dealt with throughout the thesis. Next, we will try to examine the points of contact and distancing between the conceptions of responsibility and guilt that are defended by Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers and Hans Jonas. To approach Arendt's conception of personal responsibility from his reflection on the "banality of evil," circumstantial to the judgment of Adolf Eichmann. The Eichmann judgment is synthetically analyzed. The conceptions of the phenomenon of freedom in Hannah Arendt are investigated. It presents the contemplative conception of freedom or philosophical freedom and the political conception of political freedom. The objectives of these subchapters are to show the distinction that the philosopher establishes between these two conceptions of freedom, one related to life and interior and the other related to the exercise of public virtue in the public space. The activities of the spiritual life are examined in the conception of Hannah Arendt, namely: Thinking, Willing and Judging. The concepts of Reason and Intellect are presented in order to show the distinction between these two Kantian concepts; Socrates and the two-in-one will discuss the spiritual faculty of thought; the discovery of the Will reflected on the faculty of Will and finally the faculty of judgment and its connection with responsibility.