Governança corporativa e a relação com desempenho e o valor das empresas brasileiras

Abstract

Corporate governance can be understood as a set of incentive and controls mechanisms, internal and external, which aim to minimize the costs of the problems arising from the agency. The issue is important because it is widely held assumption that governance practices affect the value and of the performance company. This thesis investigates whether the corporate governance structure was relevant to Brazilian companies from 2000 to 2010 and the recommendations of the appropriate companies and CVN IBGC achieved higher market value or performance. Five variables were considered Governance: segregation in the positions of CEO and chairman (SC), board size (TOT), board independence (INDEP), the membership levels of Corporate Governance (CG) and free actions or "free float "(FF). Applying techniques of panel data between the dependent variables of value and performance and the independent variables of corporate governance, the variable (SC) presented strong evidence that, on average, companies that had different people holding the positions of CEO and chairman, were most valued by the market. Contrary to the expected situation in relation to variable board independence (INDEP) companies with higher degree of independence had financial performance lower than the others. The free float variable was negatively correlated with the value of companies. The variable levels of adherence to corporate governance (CG) and board size (TOT) showed no statistically significant relationship against the variables of value and performance.