Paul Feyerabend e Marcelo Dascal debatem a racionalidade: desenhando uma controvérsia

Abstract

This thesis analyses the arguments on Rationality of two philosophers, Paul Feyerabend and Marcelo Dascal, who represent ideas of western philosophy in the late 20th century and beginning of the 21th century. The argument of Rationality has been a recurrent idea regarding the Philosophy of Science, from Aristotle up to current date. On his work, Paul Feyerabend criticizes both concepts of a single rationality and the critical rationality as a contemporary version of the rationalities underlying the conception of science. As Paul Feyerabend, Marcelo Dascal also criticizes the notion of the existence of a single idea for science rationalism, but both of them diverge. While Feyerabend defends the idea of irrationalism as opposed to rationalism, Dascal expands the understanding of rationality, distinguishing two modes: the traditional, based on demonstration, called hard rationality and the idea of rationality based on the probable, and our choices between both alternatives, called soft rationality. The latter supports of his theory of controversies (including the typology: ‘discussion’, ‘dispute’ and ‘controversy’), is seen by Dascal as the engine of scientific development. The thesis proposes that, if Feyerabend have had known the concept of Dascal’s soft rationality, he might not have had to resort to irrationalism and would not have been stuck to the dichotomy of the hard rationality - irrationality. In support of the thesis, the central themes from the arguments of both philosophers are examined, recognizing a possible imaginary debate between them, under the shape of a controversy. The analysis of the arguments is based on their critique of rationalism and their implications to a vision of science. Dascal’s interactions (‘discussion’, ‘dispute’ and ‘controversy’) and Feyerabend’s ‘open exchange’ and ‘closed exchange’ reveals a common platform for analysis. The exchanges, as well as discussions, develop based on sharing the assumptions and rules that oriented the debate. The open exchanges, as well as the controversies, allowed the exploration of alternatives, the rules were not a priori, but evolved with the debate. The context influenced that type of interaction andwas also influenced by it. The controversy model or the open exchanges model is based on a pragmatic philosophy, avoiding the usual notions attached to this position and implies ethics that are beyond the realms of science. This model is based on a new dialectic, on dialectic of tolerance and it opens to explore alternatives based on respect and common understanding.