Conexões sociais e remuneração de executivos: efeito moderador do controle

Abstract

This Thesis aimed to evaluate the effects of control on the relationship between the CEO's remuneration and his social connections based on a sample of 199 companies listed on B3 between 2011 and 2011. Multivariate analysis was used of data using the multiple regression technique with the application of fixed effects for panel data. None of the five research hypotheses were confirmed. However, evaluating the interaction between share control, social connections, and CEO remuneration in a defined control scenario shows that the controller's stance aligns with the expropriation perspective. The result remains even in the presence of Corporate Governance mechanisms and may signal that, in a defined control scenario, Corporate Governance structures are weakened. Regarding family control, the results differ from previous literature in that they indicate the relevance of the role of the company founder in defining the CEO's remuneration. The results also indicate that the presence of a founding CEO or founding family does not prevent his connections with the Chairman of the Board from impacting his remuneration. The additional tests reveal that the CEO's shareholding and social connections with the Chairman of the Board positively affect his remuneration. When evaluating moderation due to the controller's interference in management, it was identified that the percentage of AC members elected by the controller affects the relationship between the social connections of these members with the CEO and the CEO's remuneration negatively, in line with the perspective of replacement. In turn, the variable that expresses moderation between the variables of interest presents a positive coefficient. Thus, in a scenario of social connections, we can infer that the more significant the proportion of members elected by the controller on the Board, the higher the CEO's remuneration will be. It is also identified that the moderation in question does not entirely remove the effects of the ICS variable on remuneration. Therefore, remuneration appears to be an agency problem in this case, and the controller's actions do not favor minority shareholders.