Teoria liberal da desobediência civil

Abstract

Although, throughout history, it has not been rare to fight against certain laws or governmental acts, alleging violations of justice, the expression civil disobedience only gained the world after the posthumous publication, in the 19th century, of a lecture by Henry David Thoreau, who originally did not even carry that name, narrating his short stay in prison for refusing to collect a certain tax from the State, as a result of two main factors: the tolerance of the United States government to slavery practices and the promotion, by the American government, of a war of conquest against Mexico. With the dissemination of the work, contesting movements began to use the term to designate struggles that, while making use of illegality, employed non-violent methods and used moral reasons to oppose the order. In the 20th century, two prominent leaders, Gandhi and King Jr, led extensive civil disobedience campaigns for Indian independence and for African American civil rights, respectively. In addition to the political leadership of the movements, Gandhi and King Jr. theorized about civil disobedience, outlining strict criteria for disobedient action and demanding strong moral discipline from its adherents, in asceticism very close to religious obligations. In the decades from the 60s to the 80s of the last century, with the substantial growth of actions entitled civil disobedience, liberal theorists studied the phenomena of contestation and established parameters for their configuration, already stripped of the spiritual aspects brought by Gandhi and King Jr., enormously helping to consolidate, among public opinion, the idea that civil disobedience is not to be confused with the disrespect for legislation selfishly carried out by ordinary criminals, nor does it lend itself to violent revolutions, and that there must be a certain tolerance for the practice that, even, could help the stability of institutions. The liberal concept of civil disobedience did not suffer major challenges until the advent of new movements to confront the order in these first two decades of the 21st century. However, with the new movements, criticism of the liberal definition increased, to the point that some theorists found it not very useful for the examination of contemporary contestation. This work examines the liberal theses on civil disobedience, through two of its most notorious formulators, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls; analyzes recent phenomena of confrontation with order and philosophers critical of the liberal theory of civil disobedience, such as Robin Celikates and Candice Delmas and, finally, argues that, although with some limitations, the liberal framework of civil disobedience is still useful to illuminate the rich contesting scenario at the beginning of the century.