Posicionamento estratégico e sua relação com a dispersão salarial entre CEOs e trabalhadores nas empresas listadas na B3

Abstract

This research deals with strategic positioning and salary dispersion. Those topics are essential for management accounting, as previous studies seek to understand how competitive strategies related to remuneration and influence the financial performance of companies. This study analyses the relationship between strategic positioning and wages dispersion between CEOs and workers. A quantitative approach conducted using secondary data from publicly traded Brazilian companies listed at Brasil, Bolsa and Balcão (B3). The econometric techniques performed were confirmatory factor analysis and the least squares structural equation modelling (PLS) for quantitative variables, as for binary variables, the generalized structural equation modelling (GSEM). This study indicates that companies that seek cost leadership have lower economic performance than companies that seek differentiation. It was found that the number of members of the Board of Directors and the number of independent members were positively related to differentiation. The data also showed that salary dispersion between CEOs and workers was related to the number of members on the Board. However, cost leadership and differentiation strategies were not statistically related to salary dispersion. It indicates the limitations of strategic positioning to explain salary dispersion heterogeneity. Thus, the set of results contributes to the literature on strategic positioning, by inferring that salary dispersion can be a useful tool to consider in the structuring of workers compensation, given that it was positively associated with economic-financial performance.